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Divide and Conquer
Eric A. Posner,* Kathryn Spier,** and Adrian Vermeule***
May 26, 2009
The maxim “divide and conquer” (divide et impera) is frequently invoked in legal
theory and the social sciences. However, no single theoretical construct can capture the
ideas underlying divide and conquer. Instead, the maxim is a placeholder for a complex
of ideas related by a family resemblance, but differing in their details, mechanisms and
implications. Economists typically interpret divide and conquer in terms of a specific
class of theoretical models whose main feature, roughly speaking, is that a single actor
exploits coordination problems among a group by making discriminatory offers or
discriminatory threats. Political scientists, historians and lawyers, however, sometimes
use the term in the economists’ sense, sometimes in other senses.
We will attempt to synthesize this messy domain by offering an analytic
taxonomy of divide and conquer mechanisms, by eliciting the normative implications of
those mechanisms for legal policy, and by exploring applications in law, history and
politics. Section I clarifies some conceptual issues. Section II models several divide and
conquer mechanisms in the settings of a Stag Hunt Game and an indefinitely-repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma, and discusses their main implications for social welfare. We also
contrast divide and conquer with a mirror-image tactic – “combine and conquer” – and
identify the welfare implications of this tactic as well. Section III applies the models to a
diverse set of cases, including labor law, bankruptcy, constitutional design and the
separation of powers, imperialism and race relations, international law, litigation and
settlement, and antitrust law. We explore the conditions under which divide and conquer
reduces or enhances welfare, and the techniques that law can use to combat divide and
conquer tactics where it is beneficial to do so.

I. Conceptual Issues
We will stipulate that the following two conditions are essential to any divide and
conquer mechanism. (1) A unitary actor bargains with or competes against a set of
multiple actors. (2) The unitary actor follows an intentional strategy of exploiting
problems of coordination or collective action among the multiple actors. Here, we will
offer some general comments to clarify and justify the two conditions.
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The motivation for condition (1) is that divide and conquer is not a well-defined
idea where a unitary actor faces another unitary actor, or where a set of multiple actors
faces another such set. However, the stipulation that a “unitary actor” is necessary does
not literally require that the actor be a single natural person. Any group that has itself
overcome its internal collective action problems, at least to the point where it is capable
of pursuing a unified strategy vis-à-vis an external competitor, can be treated as a unitary
actor for present purposes. In an analysis of class conflicts in the Roman republic, the
historian Sallust argued that “the nobles had the more powerful organization, while the
strength of the commons was less effective because it was incompact and divided among
many” (1921, 225). The nobility, on this account, successfully opposed the Gracchi and
other populists “through the knights [equites], whom the hope of an alliance with the
senate had estranged from the commons” (1921, 225). The senatorial class had sufficient
cohesion to act as a unit, and used a type of discriminatory offer1 to divide the equites
from the commons. As we will see in Section II, such offers are one important class of
divide and conquer strategy.
Under condition (2), divide and conquer does not apply to situations where a
unitary actor passively benefits from internal conflict within an opposing group or
between two opposing groups, but does not itself generate that conflict through an
intentional strategy. Such cases are usually discussed under the rubric tertius gaudens
(“the third rejoices”); an example is the proverb that “when thieves fall out, honest men
come into their own” (Elster 2009, citing Simmel 1908). In Theodor Mommsen’s account
(1996), Roman imperial strategy in Germany during the reign of Tiberius had two distinct
phases. In the first phase, the imperial commander Germanicus “interfered in the internal
affairs of the Germans” by fomenting conflict between nationalist tribal leaders and other
leaders allied with Rome. Mommsen comments that this was “[q]uite the old system, in
other words: the exploitation of foreign discord.” (1996, 136). In a second phase,
however, Tiberius withdrew the Roman armies to a defensive posture and “left the
Germans to their own internal discord. . . . The tribes fell apart and no longer posed a
threat to the Roman Empire.” (1996, 137-38). The first phase – the Romans’ deliberate
strategy of creating discord among the Germanic tribes – illustrates divide et impera. The
second phase – spontaneous infighting between the tribes, to Rome’s benefit – illustrates
tertius gaudens.
The boundary between tertius gaudens and divide and conquer can be elusive.
When viewed through the haze of legal and social conflict, it is often difficult to discern
whether the beneficiary of dissension within or between opposing groups has itself
intentionally fomented that dissension. One problem is evidentiary; writers frequently
attribute a divide and conquer strategy to the beneficiary just because there is a
beneficiary, without concrete evidence of intentional strategy on the beneficiary’s part. It
has been argued that Tocqueville slipped into this error by attributing to the French
monarchy an intentional strategy to divide the French nobility from the third estate,
through discriminatory tax exemptions in favor of the former. Although in the medium
run the monarchy did benefit from the resulting divisions between nobles and

1

The translator of the Loeb edition clarifies that an “alliance” should be understood to mean “a share in
[the nobles’] privileges.”
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bourgeoisie,2 the exemption was originally created simply because the monarchy
originally lacked the political power to force taxation on the nobles, not as part of a
deliberate divide and conquer strategy (Elster 2009). As far as possible, we attempt to
avoid this evidentiary slippage in the applications we will discuss.
Another set of problems is both conceptual and taxonomic. There is a class of
cases, intermediate between divide and conquer and tertius gaudens, in which one party
declines to act because he knows that by so doing he will benefit from divisions between
or among his adversaries, yet without taking any intentional action to create or exacerbate
the division. In Mommsen’s account, Tiberius adopted a defensive stance in Germany
partly because he realized that an aggressive Roman policy encouraged the German tribes
to unify against a common enemy, whereas if left unmolested the tribes would fall to
fighting among themselves.
Finally, there is yet another important class of cases in which a divide and
conquer strategy is used in an indirect form, as when a constitutional designer creates
structural conditions that make it difficult to organize groups whose activities will reduce
overall welfare. In such cases, later generations who do not have to cope with such
groups benefit from the constitutional designers’ intentional strategy, but do not
themselves divide and conquer any opposition; if the designer’s plan has worked well, the
opposition may not even exist. As we will subsequently discuss, Madison invoked divide
and conquer to argue that the new American republic should be cast on a large scale, in
order that minorities in later generations might benefit from the difficulty of organizing
an oppressive majority faction.
In what follows, we will focus to the extent possible on the pure cases of
intentional divide and conquer tactics, including intentional but indirect examples such as
constitutional design. In particular applications, however, the evidence is too crude to
allow us to make subtle distinctions between the pure cases and the intermediate or
hybrid cases mentioned above. Where that is so, we will attempt to clearly indicate the
limits of the evidence.

II. Strategies and Mechanisms
This section describes two different game-theoretic environments where unitary
actors, who are not themselves players of these games but whose payoffs hinge on the
actions of the other players, may adopt divide-and-conquer strategies. The first
environment is based on the Stag Hunt game, also known as an Assurance game. The
second environment involves the infinite repetition of the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Although these games have very different structures, they both give rise to multiple
Pareto-rankable equilibria. Unitary actors, who are not themselves players of these
games but whose payoffs hinge on the actions of the other players, may adopt a variety of
divide-and-conquer strategies to implement their preferred outcome.

2

In the long run, however, the monarchy was harmed by the weakness of the nobles, who could not come
to the monarch’s aid against the revolutionary bourgeoisie, or so Tocqueville argued (Elster 2009).
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The Stag Hunt Game
The Stag Hunt game, which was first described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the
eighteenth century, has become a well-known metaphor for the risks and benefits of
social cooperation. In the game, a player individually decides whether to hunt rabbits or
hunt a stag without knowing the choices of the other players. Rabbit hunting is a
relatively low payoff strategy, but a player can catch a rabbit by himself. Stag hunting is
more lucrative, but requires the cooperation of others. The catch is that a unilateral
attempt to hunt stag on the part of either player results in the worst possible outcome for
that player, so each desires to cooperate if and only if the other will cooperate as well.
The two players are thus conditional cooperators (Fishbacher, Gachter, & Fehr 2001).
The stag hunt game with two players is depicted in the following figure:
Player 2
Stag

Rabbit

10

6

Stag 10

0
0

Player 1

6

Rabbit 6

6

Note that there is no inherent conflict of interest between the two players of this game.
They both would agree that hunting the stag is in their mutual interest since the individual
payoff from killing the stag, 10, exceeds the individual payoff from hunting rabbit, 6.
It is easy to see that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, one where the
players hunt the stag together, and another where they independently hunt rabbits.3 If
Player 1, for example, expects that Player 2 will hunt the stag, then Player 1 will do the
same since the payoff of hunting the stag in this scenario, 10, exceeds his payoff from
hunting rabbits, 6. But if Player 1 expects that Player 2 will hunt rabbits instead, then
Player 1 will hunt rabbits as well. Hunting the stag in this case would be fruitless for
Player 1, giving a payoff of 0, while hunting the rabbit assures a payoff of 6.
Without further refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, game theory does
not predict which of the Nash equilibria will prevail. Several observations are in order.
First, one refinement – Pareto optimality – predicts that the players will rationally
coordinate on hunting the stag. Hunting the stag will make both players better off
relative to hunting rabbits, the argument goes, so rational actors should never play the
Pareto-dominated equilibrium of rabbit hunting. Other refinements, including Harsanyi
3

There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where the players both randomize between hunting stag with
probability .6 and hunting rabbits with probability .4.
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and Selten’s (1988) concept of risk dominance,4 challenge this view. While (10,10)
certainly Pareto dominates (6,6), the latter outcome is “safer” for the two players. If
Player 1, for example, put equal weight on the chances that Player 2 would hunt the stag
or hunt rabbits, then Player 1 would rationally decide to play it safe and hunt rabbits. So
the desire for safety can, in theory, lead the players away from the socially desirable
outcome.
We will now extend the analysis to consider a variety of ways that a unitary actor
can effectively influence the outcome of the stag hunt game. An employer, for example,
may preempt the formation of a labor union by inducing or coercing groups of workers
not to participate. Similarly, a unitary defendant may prevent the formation of a plaintiff
class by selectively setting key claims out of court. The key idea is that the unitary actor
can create and exploit divisions between the game’s players, making them collectively
worse off.
The Destruction of Communication Channels
Experimental evidence on stag-hunt games suggests that coordination on stag
hunting – the players’ preferred equilibrium – is facilitated when the players can
communicate with each other.5 One famous early study explored the effect of pre-play
communication by allowing the experimental subjects to signal their intentions via
computer terminal prior to the actual play of the game. In their game, two-way pre-play
communication was a very effective coordination device, practically guaranteeing that
the subjects later played the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (Cooper et al 1992).6 Absent
communication, however, risk dominance was a better predictor of actual human
behavior.7
These experimental findings suggest that a unitary actor who wants to prevent the
stag hunt may benefit by interfering with the communication channels between the two
players. When communication is completely prevented, the players of the stag hunt are
likely to play it safe and hunt rabbits. Although this type of divide-and-conquer strategy
will be most effective (from the unitary actor’s perspective) when neither side can send
messages to the other, even preventing one side from communicating with the other may
be a successful strategy.8

4

See Harsanyi & Selten (1988) for the axiomatic foundations of this concept.
See Ochs (1995) for a survey of the experimental literature on stag hunt games.
6
Farrell (1987) provides a theoretical rationale for these findings. He essentially argued that if the players’
pre-play announcements themselves form a Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium becomes a focal point
in the later play of the game. See Aumann (1990) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) for theoretical work on
communication in coordination games. See Landeo and Spier (2008) for experimental evidence on the
effects of communication on facilitating coordination in Stag Hunt games with endogenous payoffs.
7
In Blume & Ortmann (2007), communication proves less effective when the safe alternative for the two
players improves. They also find that communication facilitates coordination even in the case of more than
two players.
8
Indeed, Cooper et al. (1992), find that one-way communication can be less useful on eliciting
coordination than two-way communication.
5
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The Payment of Bribes.
The unitary actor can prevent the players from hunting the stag through the
payment of bribes.9 Imagine, as shown in the figure below, that the unitary actor
promises to pay X1 to player 1 if he hunts rabbits. Note that this bribe to Player 1 is paid
regardless of whether Player 2 hunts rabbits or hunts the stag. Similarly, the unitary
actor promises to pay X2 to Player 2 for hunting rabbits.
Player 2
Stag

Rabbit

10

6 + X2
0

Stag 10
0

Player 1

6 + X2
6 + X1

Rabbit 6 + X1

Nondiscriminatory bribes. Imagine that the unitary actor does not discriminate
between the two players and sets X1 = X2 = 5. Such bribes would guarantee that the
players would hunt rabbits: hunting rabbits becomes a dominant strategy for both players
and is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. These non-discriminatory
bribes are expensive, however, requiring the unitary actor to spend a total of 5 + 5 = 10 to
prevent the stag hunt. The unitary actor may be able to accomplish the same outcome
without such high bribes, however. Suppose that X1 = X2 = 3, so each player receives 6 +
3 = 9 from hunting rabbits. Although the new game between Player 1 and Player 2 has
exactly the same two pure-strategy Nash equilibria as before (hunting stags and hunting
rabbits), and (10,10) Pareto dominates (9,9), it surely more likely that the players will
hunt rabbits when these bribes are offered. Since a payoff of 9 is only slightly less than a
payoff of 10, even a small amount of doubt on the part of a player would lead him to play
it safe.
Discriminatory bribes. The unitary actor can achieve his objectives in a reliable
and cost-effective manner by discriminating between the two players. As shown in
theory (Segal & Whinston 2000) and verified in the laboratory (Landeo & Spier 2008),
the unitary actor can implement his preferred outcome by bribing just one of the players,
setting X1 = 5 and X2 = 0, for example. When X1 = 5, Player 1 has a dominant strategy to
hunt rabbits. Player 2, knowing this, will hunt rabbits as well. As a result, hunting rabbits
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Indeed, this type of divide-and-conquer

9

We are implicitly assuming that the players of these games are not able to bribe each other or to write
binding contracts with each other limiting their actions. This assumption would be valid if the players are
dispersed and disorganized, or if they lack a credible mechanism to enforce their contracts.

7

strategy is the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game (Segal & Whinston
2000).10
The unitary actor’s power may be enhanced even further if he can credibly
approach the two players in sequence, making take-it-or-leave-it offers to each. If Player
1 hasn’t accepted a bribe yet, the unitary actor can assure himself that the two parties will
hunt rabbits by paying Player 2 a bribe X2 = 5 to hunt rabbits. Knowing that Player 2 has
signed the contract to hunt rabbits, Player 1 will hunt rabbits too. Now suppose that the
unitary actor can approach Player 1 first. Player 1 realizes that if he rejects a bribe, he
can only expect to receive a payoff of 6 from hunting rabbits in the future. The unitary
actor can successfully offer Player 1 a bribe of X1 = 1, locking him into rabbit hunting.
After Player 1 is on board, there is no reason to offer any further bribes to Player 2 (Segal
& Whinston 2000; Che & Spier 2008).11
It is important to note that the unitary actor may in fact lose power when the
bargaining power is shifted to the two players. Suppose that the two players approach the
unitary actor in sequence and present take-it-or-leave-it demands to the unitary actor. As
before, these demands are bribes that the unitary actor would pay to the offeror for
playing rabbit. Suppose further that the unitary actor derives an incremental value of 10
if the players hunt rabbits, and will receive nothing if they hunt the stag. We can easily
construct the equilibrium demands using backward induction. If no deal has been struck
between the unitary actor and Player 1, then Player 2 will offer X2 = 9 in exchange for
hunting rabbits. The unitary actor will accept, and will get an incremental payoff of 10 –
9 = 1. Working backwards, Player 1 will anticipate this outcome and offer an even
smaller bribe, X1 = 8, for hunting rabbits. The unitary actor accepts this offer, and no
further negotiations with Player 2 are necessary. Since Player 1 has a dominant strategy
to hunt rabbits with the bribe of 8, Player 2 will hunt rabbits as well. Note that Player 1 is
capturing surplus at the expense of Player 2 (Stremitzer 2008).12
Conditional bribes. Finally, the unitary actor can do even better if the bribes that
he offers can be made conditional on the actions of both players. Suppose that the
unitary actor offers a bribe of X1 to Player 1 with the understanding that the bribe will be
paid only if Player 1 hunts rabbit and Player 2 hunts stag. The bribe to player 2, X2, is
offered on similar terms. Under these terms, no bribes are paid when both players hunt
rabbits. The new game is shown in the figure below.

10

This refinement requires that the equilibrium be immune to self-enforcing coalition deviations (Bernheim
et al., 1987).
11
This latter argument does rely on the contracts being binding on the players. Player 2 cannot accept a
bribe and then later renege on his commitment to hunt rabbits. This assumption may not always be
reasonable in applied settings. Note, however, that an ongoing relationship between Player 2 and the
unitary actor (which might be common in real-world settings) might ensure Player 2’s commitment.
12
Note that this outcome does not rely upon the offeror being bound to hunt rabbits. This result is very
sensitive to the timing of the offers. If the players made simultaneous offers instead, then they would both
offer very small amounts and the unitary actor would do extremely well (Che & Spier 2008).
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Player 2
Stag

Rabbit

10

6 + X2
0

Stag 10
0

Player 1

6

Rabbit 6 + X1

6

Suppose that X1 = X2 = 5. It is clear in this case that the game has been
transformed from a stag hunt into a prisoners dilemma. If Player 1 believes that Player 2
will hunt stag, then Player 1 will hunt rabbit (since 11 is greater than 10). If Player 1
believes that Player 2 will hunt rabbits then Player 1 will hunt rabbits as well since 6 is
larger than 0. To put it somewhat differently, when X1 = X2 = 5 then hunting rabbits is a
dominant strategy for both players. Hunting rabbits is therefore the unique Nash
equilibrium and the equilibrium payoffs are (6,6). Since no bribes are actually paid in
equilibrium, the unitary actor is able to achieve his preferred outcome at zero cost.13
Asymmetric Information.
Alternatively, the unitary actor may succeed in preventing the players from
hunting the stag by convincing one (or both) players that the other player is
untrustworthy. One way to formalize this is by introducing asymmetric information
about the players’ payoffs. Suppose, for example, that Player 1 has private information
about an additional personal benefit, “B1,” that he will receive from hunting rabbits. The
game is shown below:
Player 2
Stag

Rabbit

10

6

Stag 10

0
0

Player 1

6

Rabbit 6 + B1

6 + B1

13

The basic idea here can be extended to multiple-player games. See the analysis of vote-buying in
Section III.D., based on Dal Bo (2007).
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Player 2 knows the distribution of Player 1’s private benefit: with probability θ Player 1’s
benefit is positive and with probability 1–θ this private benefit is zero.14
Regardless of the values of B1 and θ, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
where both players hunt rabbits. As before, if Player 2 believes that Player 1 will hunt
rabbits he will do the same, and similarly for Player 1. However, when B1 and θ are high
enough then hunting rabbits becomes the unique equilibrium of the game. Suppose that
B1 > 4 and θ > .40 and that these values are common knowledge. Player 2, being
rational, realizes that Player 1 will hunt Rabbit at least 40% of the time, since hunting
rabbit is a dominant strategy for Player 1 when B1 > 4. Therefore the highest payoff that
Player 2 can hope to get by hunting the stag is less than (.60)(10) + (.40)(0) = 6. With
these parameter values, it cannot be rational for Player 2 to hunt the stag. Knowing this,
Player 1 will never hunt the stag either (even if his private benefit is zero).
The unitary actor may be able to divide and conquer the players of this game by
credibly signaling to Player 2 that the probability θ that Player 1 has a preference for
rabbit hunting and that Player 1’s benefit of non-cooperation, B1, are sufficiently large.15
In such cases, the divide and conquer tactic operates not by altering the players’
incentives, but by affecting their beliefs.
The Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Divide-and-conquer strategies may also be successfully employed by the unitary
actor when Players 1 and 2 are engaged in a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Player 2
Stay Quiet

Confess

10

16

Stay Quiet 10

0
0

Player 1
Confess 16

6
6

The structure of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is, of course, quite different from the Stag Hunt.
In the one-shot version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, confessing is a dominant strategy for

14

A positive benefit may arise for any number of reasons. Perhaps Player 1 has a strong preference for
rabbit meat over venison.
15
The information would need to be credible, of course. This third party has a natural incentive to lie and
exaggerate the magnitude of the parameters, and if the players know this, they will ignore any noncredible
statements intended to arouse distrust.
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both players and is the unique Nash equilibrium.16 But if the players repeat this game
indefinitely, or the players do not know when the game will end, additional equilibria
arise by virtue of the folk theorem. Indeed, if the parties interact frequently with each
other and can readily observe each others’ past actions, full cooperation may be possible.
Intuitively, Player 1 (for example) is deterred from confessing in any given round of the
game believing, correctly, that if he confesses then Player 2 will confess in the next
round, tit-for-tat. Since any defection from the cooperative outcome will be met with
retaliation in the long run, the players can prevent short-run opportunistic behavior.
Experimental data support these theoretical findings (Dal Bo, 2005).17
Cooperation in the indefinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is most easily
formalized when players adopt trigger strategies, where defection by one player is met by
the reversion to the Nash equilibrium of (confess, confess) in the next period and in every
period after that. Suppose that the players both discount time with discount rate r. A
long-run cooperative equilibrium where both players stay quiet exists when a player’s
private gain from cheating and confessing, 16 – 10 = 6, is smaller than the long run loss
of reverting to the non-cooperative outcome:18
6 < (1+r)–14 + (1+r)–24 + (1+r)–34 + … = (1/r)4.
Rearranging terms, cooperation may be sustained in the long run when r < .67.
Intuitively, when the discount rate is small the players place higher value on the future,
and have both a private and social interest in sustaining cooperation.
Here too, there are a variety of ways that a unitary actor can manipulate this game
in order to reduce the likelihood of cooperation between the two players.
Destroying Communication Channels.
In the Stag Hunt game described above, communication channels facilitated the
players’ ability to coordinate on their preferred outcome. That observation is relevant in
the indefinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma as well. It is well understood that repetition
is of limited value in the Prisoners’ Dilemma when the players cannot observe the actions
that have been chosen by the other players in previous rounds. In short, the players
cannot implement their preferred retaliation strategies. Suppose that there is a lag of, say,
2 rounds before a defection by Player 1 would be noticed by Player 2. This would imply
that Player 1 could get away with confessing for 2 periods before the retaliation occurs.
Formally, Player 1 would cooperate only when his short-run benefit from confessing for
two rounds exceeds the long run loss of reversion to the uncooperative Nash equilibrium.
6 + (1+r)–1(6) < (1+r)–2 4 + (1+r)–34 + …
16

If Player 1 believes that Player 2 will stay quiet, Player 1 will confess since 16 > 10. If Player 1 thinks
that Player 2 will confess, then Player 1 will confess as well since 6 > 0.
17
Dal Bo (2005) finds that the higher the probability of continuation, the higher the levels of cooperation.
While in the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma games the cooperation rate is 9 percent, for a probability of
continuation of ¾, it is 38 percent. In addition, Dal Bo compares the results from indefinitely-repeated
games with the results from finitely repeated games. He finds that the level of cooperation in the final
round of the finitely-repeated games is similar to the level of cooperation in one-shot games. In addition,
these levels of cooperation are lower than those observed in indefinitely repeated games, providing
evidence that subjects cooperate less when there is no future.
18
The loss in each round is 10 – 6 = 4.
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It is not hard to show that this will be true only when the discount rate is r < .29. More to
the point, the discount rate must be even smaller than before to compensate for the
adverse incentive effects of the detection lag.
The problem will, of course, be
exacerbated even further when the detection is even less perfect than this.19
Limiting the Frequency or Duration of Interaction.
The unitary actor can also prevent coordination by limiting the duration and
frequency of the interactions between the two players. This may be achieved in two
different ways.
First, the unitary actor may attempt to manipulate the strategic environment by
creating a finite horizon for the two parties. If the two players knew that they would be
playing the game for 10 periods only, say, then the cooperative equilibrium would cease
to exist. In short, tit-for-tat strategies are ineffective when the game has a last period.
This may be verified using backward induction. Suppose that the players have arrived in
the 10th period, and they both know that it is the last. Each has a dominant strategy to
confess at that point, regardless of what has happened in the past. Therefore confessing
by both players is the unique outcome in the last round. In the 9th round, the parties will
confess as well since there is no reward for cooperating – after all, both know that they
will confess in the next period. This logic implies that confessing is the unique outcome
in each and every period of the game.
Second, the unitary actor can potentially manipulate the parties to interact with
each other less frequently. Suppose that the parties play the Prisoners’ Dilemma every
other period. Cooperation will be possible only when
6 < (1+r)–2 4 + (1+r)–44 + (1+r)–64 …
This is possible only when the discount rate is sufficiently small, r < .29. When they
played this game in every period instead, the discount rate could be significantly higher, r
< .67.
The Payment of Bribes.
The unitary actor can make confession even more attractive for the two players by
offering bribes, X1 and X2 , as shown in the figure below.

19

Similar results hold when instead of a detection lag, a defection will go unobserved with positive
probability in each round.

12

Player 2
Stay Quiet

Confess

10

16 + X2
0

Stay Quiet 10
0

Player 1
Confess 16 + X1

6 + X2
6 + X1

Nondiscriminatory bribes. Suppose that the unitary actor offers the two players X1
= X2 = 5 in exchange for a confession. Confessing is still a dominant strategy for each
player, for the unilateral incentive to confess is even stronger than before. As before,
(confess, confess) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The players’
equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium, (11,11), are higher than their payoffs would be if
they both remained silent (10,10). Importantly, the players can do no better for
themselves through the infinite repetition of this game. A player can always guarantee
himself a payoff of at least 11 by confessing, and there does not exist another outcome
that delivers higher payoffs to both players.20
Discriminatory bribes. The unitary actor may be able to achieve his goals at an
even lower cost, however. In order to break the cooperative equilibrium where both
players stay quiet, it is sufficient to bribe just one of the two players. Suppose that Player
1 is the lucky recipient of the bribe, X1 = 5. As before, both players have a dominant
strategy to confess in the one-shot game. As in the case of nondiscriminatory bribes,
both players remaining silent is not a Nash equilibrium of the indefinitely-repeated game.
The reason is simple: Player 1 can guarantee himself a payoff of at least 11 in every
round by confessing and taking the bribe. He would not be satisfied remaining silent and
receiving a payoff of 10 in each and every round when he can get a minimum of 11 by
confessing.21
Conditional bribes. Finally, the unitary actor may be able to achieve this same
outcome at an even lower cost (Acemoglu, Robinson & Verdier 2004). The mere threat
to divide-and-conquer through bribes can be profitably used to coerce the two players to
confess. The unitary actor may be able to convince Player 2 to confess in each and every
round of the game by threatening to reward Player 1 with the regular payment of a
suitably high bribe. This can be quite effective: Player 2 realizes that if he challenges the
unitary actor’s authority by remaining quiet, there will be no hope of cooperating in the
future with Player 1 (who will be compensated for uncooperative behavior). Similarly,
20

More generally, the unitary actor can prevent cooperation and induce confessions by offering
nondiscriminatory bribes X1 = X2 > 4.
21
Both parties confessing is certainly an equilibrium of the indefinitely-repeated game. There also exist
other equilibria that rely on the players alternating between staying quiet and confessing.
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the unitary actor credibly threatens to reward Player 1 if Player 2 were to challenge his
authority be remaining quiet in any round. It is important to recognize that the actual use
of this divide-and-conquer strategy by the unitary actor remains off the equilibrium path,
and hence will not be observed, but will nonetheless fundamentally shape equilibrium
behavior.
Asymmetry of the Players and “Combine and Conquer”
Finally, differences among the players of indefinitely-repeated games – including
differences in their time horizons and their economic stakes – may impede their ability to
cooperate with each other over time. In practice, players with similar characteristics find
it easier to coordinate on behaviors that are in their mutual interest, and can more easily
detect deviations by others.
This phenomenon has been observed in markets where competitors attempt to
coordinate their pricing decisions without explicitly communicating with one another.
(Explicit communication would run afoul of the United States antitrust laws.) In the
airline industry, for example, asymmetries abound. Some airlines may be in sound
financial shape, for example, while others may be experiencing financial distress. Some
airlines are positioned as high-quality carriers, while others offer lower service levels.
While some airline have a higher cost structures (due, perhaps, to a broader hub and
spoke system), others may enjoy lower costs. Making things even more complicated,
airlines may experience different dynamic shocks to their demand curves and production
technologies. These factors tend to make it difficult for the airlines to agree – tacitly or
otherwise – on which prices are appropriate for the market conditions, and to ascertain
whether a price cut by a rival is a reflection of changing market conditions or whether it
constitutes cheating.22 These asymmetries, and the price wars that consequently erupt,
may serve the interests of society more broadly. Consumers often benefit from
heightened competition in markets, and the law seeks to encourage such competition.
Unitary actors sometimes take intentional actions to weaken groups by
intermixing players with dissimilar interests and stakes. Early in the 20th century, some
American employers voluntarily integrated their workforces in the hope that racial
antagonisms among subgroups would prevent workers as whole from concerting their
efforts through bargaining or strikes (Roemer 1979). In 1937, “the foreman of the
Griffen Ranch [stated that] ‘Last year our Hindu workers struck. So this year we mixed
half Mexicans in with them, and we aren’t having any labor trouble (Roemer 1979, 696,
n. 1).’” We will refer to this type of strategy as “combine and conquer.”
The Choice Among Strategies
It might be asked what determines the unitary actor’s choice among strategies.
Why would unitary actors ever use nondiscriminatory bribes when discriminatory bribes
are cheaper, and discriminatory bribes when conditional bribes are cheaper still? Or why
bribe at all when one can disrupt communications? The answer is that the choice of
strategies will be determined by technological and institutional constraints, whose nature
depends upon the context. Conditional bribes may require sophisticated contracts, which
in turn will require enforcement mechanisms. Discriminatory bribes may provoke
22

See the discussion in David Besanko et al. (2006); Dennis Carlton & Jeffrey Perloff (2004).
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suspicion and the formation of coalitions. Law may rule out some strategies. Rather than
trying to generalize about the costs and benefits of different strategies, we will examine
how they work in specific settings.
Normative Implications
To elicit the normative implications of our analysis, we must distinguish the
optimal outcome for the two players (excluding the unitary actor), the optimal outcome
for the two players plus the unitary actor, and the optimal outcome for society as a whole
(which includes a broader set of stakeholders).
For two players only. In the Stag Hunt Game, the optimal outcome is for each
player to hunt a stag. The total payoff, 20, is higher than it is for any other combination
of moves. Similarly, in the indefinitely-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, the optimal
outcome is for each player to stay quiet. If the social goal is to maximize payoffs for the
two players, then the unitary actor’s tactics are unambiguously bad because they prevent
the two players from receiving the highest payoffs.
For the two players plus the unitary actor. We have not made assumptions about
the payoffs for the unitary actor but we can certainly do so. Consider first the Stag Hunt
Game. If the unitary actor causes both players to hunt rabbits, then those players
collectively obtain 12 rather than 20. Thus, the divide and conquer tactics are socially
optimal if the unitary actor gains more than 8 from the players’ failure to coordinate. If
the unitary actor causes only one player to hunt rabbits, the players collectively obtain 6.
Accordingly, the divide and conquer tactics are socially optimal only if the gain to the
unitary actor exceeds 14. A similar point can be made about divide and conquer tactics
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Whether divide and conquer tactics are bad for the main actors, then, depends on
context. Suppose, for example, that the unitary actor is an employer and the other players
are workers. If unionization would raise the employer’s costs significantly, then divide
and conquer tactics would be socially justified. If they would not, then divide and
conquer tactics would not be socially justified. As we will see, labor law does not make
this distinction. Labor law bans certain harsh divide-and-conquer tactics (like bribes) and
the ban does not depend on whether unionization raises costs or not.
For society as a whole. The activities of the two players and of the unitary actor
can also produce harms and benefits for society as a whole. When firms have market
power, they can use divide and conquer tactics to restrict entry and keep prices high for
consumers. When firms do not have market power, divide-and-conquer tactics should
reduce costs and hence prices for consumers.
The law. As a result, law and public policy should not reflect general approval or
disapproval of divide and conquer tactics. Instead, law should try to rule out divide and
conquer tactics where they reduce total payoffs for society as a whole, yet should allow
them where they enhance welfare. In what follows, we undertake a fine-grained analysis
of the conditions under which law should pursue one approach or the other.
Where it is beneficial to do so, law can suppress divide and conquer tactics
through a nondiscrimination rule, which prevents the unitary actor from splitting similar
groups through dissimilar treatment. Indeed, Section III illustrates, we observe laws or
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norms against “discrimination” in labor law, bankruptcy law, international law, and
important areas of constitutional law. In all these cases, the nondiscrimination rule can
be justified23 as a device for discouraging divide and conquer tactics on the part of
dominant players who have incentives to act contrary to the public interest. On the other
hand, it may be socially desirable for the unitary actor to treat other players differently.
For example, people may cooperate better in two small groups where preferences are
similar, than in one large group where preferences are different. A divide and conquer
strategy that converts the large group into two uniform subgroups may increase efficiency
and enhance social welfare. In such cases, the law needs to distinguish between good
divisions and bad divisions. When such fine distinctions are not possible, a ban on
discrimination will have both good and bad effects and may do more harm than good
overall.
The law should also be alert to the flip-side of divide and conquer, namely the
“combine and conquer” strategy described earlier. Recall that the unitary actor may be
able to weaken the opposition by combining groups with dissimilar interests or
commitments into a single legal unit, whose internal dissensions will render it ineffective.
The use of combine and conquer tactics can be either welfare-reducing or welfareenhancing depending upon the circumstances. As we will see, James Madison advocated
a type of combine and conquer strategy in constitutional design. By consolidating groups
with dissimilar interests and commitments into a single extended republic, Madison
aimed to reduce the risk of majority factions – a kind of constitutional union-busting.

III. Applications
We turn to applications. Our aim is not to be comprehensive; divide and conquer
explanations are invoked across all fields and subfields of law, history and the social
sciences, and we lack the competence to evaluate most of those cases. Rather, we will
select cases that allow us to illustrate the divide and conquer mechanisms set out in
Section II, and to explore the normative implications of those mechanisms. Throughout,
we attempt to identify the conditions under which divide and conquer (and its flip-side,
combine and conquer) promote or decrease welfare.
A. Labor Law
Divide and conquer tactics have a long history in labor relations. Before the
modern legal regime began in the 1930s, workers attempted to organize by forming a
union and committing not to make separate agreements with the employer. The idea was
to force the employer to bargain with the union representative rather than with workers
individually, and also to prevent the employer from hiring replacement workers from
outside the union. Employers resisted, and unions reacted by calling strikes, which
would deprive the employer of all its workers en masse, and would also, through the
picket line, prevent the employer from hiring replacements. Employers tried to preempt
union organization by firing and intimidating organizers, and by bribing workers not to
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Whether the anti-discrimination rule can be explained on such grounds is a different question, on which
we express no view.
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join unions24—classic divide and conquer tactics—and workers responded with sabotage
and other forms of violence and resistance. In the words of one union official:
The American trade-union movement is as old as this country and so is unionbusting. Ever since a small group of colonial printers formed the first labor guild,
there have been employers determined to prevent workers from organizing. The
history books are filled with tales of Pinkertons, gun squads, blacklists and yellow
dog contracts designed to frustrate the organizing efforts of workers. Illegal
firings, spies, racism, sexism, and company unions are part of an almost endless
list of dirty tricks employed by anti-union employers. And while different tactics
have been used through the years, the strategy of union-busting remains
timeless—divide workers from one another to prevent them from organizing
(Oversight Hearings Subcommittee of Labor-Management Relations Committee
on Education and Labor 1979).
The National Labor Relations Act sought to minimize the violence and disruption
of union organization drives by setting up a formal election procedure administered by
the National Labor Relations Board.25 Typically, an existing union would seek to
organize a workplace by persuading and educating workers and trying to convince them
to vote for union representation. Under the NLRA, once a threshold level of interest has
been satisfied, a formal election process is held. Employers are prevented from
interfering with the union’s organizing efforts, but have the right to launch their own
campaigns, in which they try to persuade workers that a union would not serve their
interest. Crucially, employers are forbidden to use bribes and threats: they cannot reward
workers (with promotions, bonuses, and the like) who resist unionization and they cannot
fire, demote, or otherwise punish workers who support unionization. The election is
decided by majority vote.
The NLRA put constraints on management but divide and conquer tactics lived
on. Martin Jay Levitt, a former professional union-buster, recounts the tactics he used in
an influential memoir (Levitt & Conrow 1993).26 The tactics are variations on divide and
conquer.
It was essential to Levitt’s campaigns to divide the foremen and other immediate
supervisors from the regular workers (1993, 10, 173–74).27 These two groups would
often have a great deal in common. Foremen typically rose from the group of regular
workers, and retained social and family ties with them. Senior management consisted of
outsiders, usually professionals, who did not interact much with the workers. So the
sympathies of foreman lay with the workers and they frequently sympathized with the
workers’ desire to unionize.
24

Employers would ask workers to enter “yellow dog contracts,” which made employment conditional on
the worker refraining from joining a union. See Epstein 1983, for a discussion and defense. We do not take
a normative position on the legislation that prohibited this and related conduct.
25
Wagner Act, National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74 – 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169).
26
Levitt’s description of modern union-busting tactics, his own and others’, is amply confirmed by four
volumes of testimony before the Oversight Hearings Subcommittee of Labor-Management Relations
Committee on Education and Labor in 1979.
27
See also, Hearings 1979, vol. 3, at 76 (practices of other anti-union consultants).
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Fortunately for Levitt, the NLRA does not grant protections to supervisors, and
these supervisors could be punished for failing to follow management’s orders.
Management can thus straightforwardly encourage supervisors to oppose unionization.
Levitt would further work on dividing the supervisors from the workers by trying to get
the supervisors to identify with the managers, so that they would enthusiastically
discharge their task of delivering anti-union messages to the workers and disclosing
worker’s attitudes about unionization to management. Workers who might otherwise
have benefited from solidarity with their supervisors accordingly found themselves
standing alone.
Levitt and other union-busters would also try to divide the rank-and-file workers
themselves by offering rewards and punishments, including time off, bonuses, and other
rewards for anti-union workers, and harassment of various sorts of pro-union workers
(Levitt 1993, 28, 105, 215–17).28 As noted above, this activity is illegal under the
NLRA, but it was pursued nonetheless. In one case described by Levitt, management
made clear that good jobs in a new facility would be made available to anti-union
workers and not to pro-union workers (1993, 221). In more bare-knuckled campaigns,
management would spread false rumors about union organizers (for example, that they
have committed crimes), spy on them, release personal information about them, falsely
accuse them of violating work rules and discipline them, and so forth.29
Other anti-union tactics had similar justifications. One effective tactic to prevent
organization from occurring was to form “rotating employee committees.” Managers
would meet with groups of workers on a regular basis to hear their complaints about
working conditions. Crucially, the membership of the committees would “rotate,” that is,
change continually. The theory was that “by continually changing the makeup of the
employee committee, management could keep abreast of complaints and rumors
circulating in various departments without creating a bond among participants or
inadvertently developing leaders.”30 As discussed in Section II, game theorists have
shown that cooperation in an n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is very difficult because
players must have a great deal of information about what other players are doing, and that
cooperation depends on repeated interaction over time. By interfering with repeated
interactions and adding “noise” to workers’ information about each other’s behavior
(though the spreading of rumors), employers would try to undermine the strategic basis
for cooperation.
The NLRA divides a workplace into communities of interest. The theory is that
workers with distinct interests should bargain in separate units. An airline, for example,
will deal with separate mechanics, pilots, and flight attendants’ unions. According to
Levitt, management tends to prefer larger bargaining units with more diverse workers
who can be played off each other. So in one campaign, he tried to ensure that promanagement lab technicians and clerical assistants would be lumped together with the
production workers. Members of the first two groups tended to think of themselves as
28
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Id., passim.
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Id. at 40.
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professionals and to identify with management, and thus were less likely to vote with the
production workers to form a union.31 This illustrates the “combine and conquer”
technique discussed in Section II, where a group that poses a threat is diluted with
friendly individuals.
The workers face a problem of collective action. In the absence of the employer’s
interference, the worker’s problem could be modeled in at least two ways. On the stag
hunt interpretation, each worker gains by organizing as long as other workers organize.
If a worker does not organize, she receives a lower payoff. If the worker organizes while
other workers do not organize, she receives the lowest payoff. On the prisoners’ dilemma
interpretation, again each worker gains as long as other workers organize, and does less
well if no workers organize; the difference here is that a worker does best if she does not
organize while others do organize. Both models seem realistic; each could capture
incentives in somewhat different settings. In one workplace, a worker who fails to
cooperate with other workers may not share in the benefits of collective bargaining (for
example, a higher wage) and thus be worse off (Stag Hunt); in another workplace, a
worker who free rides may nonetheless benefit from the collective bargaining, for
example, safety procedures are improved (Prisoner’s Dilemma).
The employer has a strong incentive to prevent workers from organizing.
Organized workers can drive up costs or obtain a share of the employer’s rents, in either
case reducing profits. The union-busting tactics described above reflect most of the
divide-and-conquer strategies we discussed in Part I. Employers design the workplace to
limit congregation and assign workers to shifts in such a way as to minimize repeated
contact. These tactics interfere with communication, which is vital for coordination on
focal points and for cooperation in general. The tactics also weaken cooperation by
reducing opportunities for retaliation against cheaters. If workers do not repeatedly
congregate in identical groups, then they cannot retaliate against cheaters by imposing
social sanctions on them.
Employers also provide false information about the motives of unions and union
organizers.32 When a campaign begins, the problem for workers is that they do not know
whether union organization, which almost always involves outsiders coming in to help
them organize, will serve their interests. Union organizers argue that organization allows
workers to obtain higher pay and more generous benefits. Employers argue that union
dues exceed the benefits from organization, and that unions introduce rigid workplace
rules that are unfair and bureaucratic. When employers float rumors, misrepresent the
motives of unions, and so forth, they introduce noise, which may interfere with
organization efforts by obscuring the difference between “cheating” and “cooperation”
among workers.
Finally, as we have seen, employers use bribes and sanctions to divide workforces
into groups with competing interests so as to minimize the probability that a majority will
vote for a union. Employers sometimes raise wages for all workers prior to the union
election, in the hope that workers will believe that collective bargaining is unnecessary,
but this tactic is far more costly than dividing and conquering. From the employer’s
31
32
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perspective, it makes more sense to bribe only a bare majority of the workers, and better
yet, to price discriminate, giving smaller bribes to workers less inclined to organize and
larger bribes to those more inclined to organize. One of the key functions of supervisors
is to identify the pro-union workers, the anti-union workers, and the wavering workers,
and to report that information to management (which is legal). With this information in
hand, management can target the wavering workers—who will be more willing to vote
against the union in response to bribes and threats (which is illegal but may be hard to
detect). In this way, the cost of union-busting is minimized.
The law addresses these problems in largely sensible but imperfect ways. The
within-unit nondiscrimination rule formally prohibits divide-and-conquer tactics but
management appears to be able to execute those tactics at least at some level because of
the difficulties of detection and weak sanctions. The controls on elections help workers
communicate with each other and strengthen bonds, but they, too, are limited. Finally,
the division of workers into separate bargaining units can also be understood as a way to
enhance cooperation among workers by ensuring that workers interact with workers who
have similar interests.
One might ask why employers do not try the conditional bribe, which in this case
would involve offering each worker a payment if and only if the worker casts the pivotal
“no” vote in a union election. The simple answer is that the secret ballot, which is legally
required, makes it impossible for the employer to verify the workers’ votes and thus
undermines the credibility of the workers’ acceptance of the offer; anticipating this, the
employer will not make the offer in the first place. (Even without this legal barrier,
however, one might wonder whether employees would trust an employer who offers a
contract that involves no payment in equilibrium. An employer who makes such an offer
might seem inherently untrustworthy.) At the same time, because the ballot is kept secret
not only from the employer but from the other workers, it prevents workers from
knowing whether other workers cooperated, weakening their ability to sanction each
other for defecting. Thus, the secret ballot blunts divide and conquer, but also weakens
the underlying cooperation that the unitary actor seeks to undermine.
B. Bankruptcy Law
Divide and conquer tactics play an important role in bankruptcy proceedings. A
typical example occurred during the Chapter 11 case of Adelphia Communications.33
The debtors’ plan, like all plans in bankruptcy, divided the creditors into different classes,
each of which votes separately to approve the plan. After all the classes approved the
debtors’ plan, a group of creditors in one of the senior bondholders’ classes claimed that
they had been outvoted because plan supporters bribed and threatened other voters in that
class. The bribes took the form of releases, exculpations, and fee reimbursements for
those who voted for the plan; the threats took the form of what the bankruptcy judge
called a “scorched earth litigation strategy”—namely, the filing of unnecessary motions,
discovery, and other litigation tactics that imposed costs—against those who refused to
vote for the plan.
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To understand how these tactics might have succeeded, one needs to understand
how the bankruptcy process works. The plan divides creditors into separate classes; each
class approves the plan if a majority of the creditors in the class holding at least two
thirds of the value of the claims vote in favor of the plan. Creditors cannot receive less
than what they would receive if the firm were liquidated, but if the firm has positive
going concern value, then the surplus—the difference between going concern and
liquidation value—must be divided somehow. The plan can allocate the surplus by
giving some creditors more—in terms of cash, or debt or equity interests in the
reorganized firm—than others.
Suppose that in the Adelphia case, the creditors in the senior bondholders class in
question consisted of 100 individuals or firms with identical $10 claims; that the
liquidation value of the firm was 50 cents on the dollar and that the going concern value
was 75 cents on the dollar. The debtor and other plan supporters might first calculate that
they must give the senior bondholders at least 50 cents on the dollar in order to satisfy the
rule that they obtain at least the liquidation value of their claims. But if the plan
supporters give everyone in the class only this amount, the members of the senior
bondholders’ class would have no reason to support the plan—they might as well force a
renegotiation or try to propose their own plan. Thus, the plan supporters must give the
class members more. But how much more?
One approach would be to give the plan members their going concern value—75
cents on the dollar. But the plan supporters would rather save more of the surplus for
themselves. They might be able to secure consent by offering, say, 60 cents on the
dollar. The creditors would vote in favor of the plan if they think that the alternative is
liquidation or an alternative plan, after further negotiations, that is no more generous. Let
us suppose that this is the case. The plan supporters could do still better for themselves
by using divide and conquer tactics.
Consider an approach where the plan members offer 50 cents on the dollar in the
plan, but in addition offer side payments of 10 cents on the dollar to 67 of the 100
creditors if they vote for the plan. Those 67 creditors will vote for the plan, and so the
plan supporters end up paying 60 cents to two-thirds of the creditors rather than to all of
them.
This is a very simple way of dividing and conquering, and bankruptcy judges can
often identify this behavior and discourage it.34 Plans are supposed to be “equitable,”
meaning that like creditors are treated alike. This rule is essentially a nondiscrimination
rule, though one of a special sort: discrimination can occur between classes but not within
classes.
Yet this rule gives participants the power to divide and conquer by putting similar
creditors in different classes. In a typical bankruptcy involving a large corporation, there
may be thousands of creditors who have different interests and capacities. A large
corporation might face, for example: bondholders, who are dispersed and unorganized;
34
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trade creditors, who hope to maintain a relationship with the firm that emerges from
bankruptcy; secured creditors, who simply want their collateral back; undersecured
creditors, who also have an interest in maximizing going concern value; employees, who
fear for their jobs; a bank, which has deep knowledge of the firm’s finances and
relationships with its managers; government creditors, which may have various political
interests, such as helping a large local employer; and many others. If the debtor can
manage to put creditors with different interests in the same class, and creditors with the
same interests in different classes, then it can ensure that creditors with stronger interests
in receiving money are outvoted by creditors with stronger interests in seeing the debtor
survive as a going concern.
A simple example will illustrate this point. Suppose that a debtor has six
creditors, each with claims worth $100. The firm is worth more if liquidated ($500) than
if it continues as a going concern ($450). However, creditors 1, 2, 3, and 4 gain $10 in
future business if the firm continues as a going concern. It is optimal for the firm to be
liquidated even taking into account these gains (which may just be transfers, anyway).
The debtor can nonetheless secure approval of a reorganization plan if it can divide the
pro-liquidation creditors, 5 and 6, into two separate classes, so that each will be outvoted
two to one, and approval from both classes will be obtained. Bankruptcy law rules
governing the formation of classes, as well as the absolute priority rule, which in theory
requires every creditor to do as well as it would if liquidation would occur, might limit
the room for such strategic maneuvering. But there is little doubt that it occurs.
It might be asked why the nondiscrimination rule is not applied more generally.
Suppose that all creditors at the same priority must receive identical pro rata shares. Such
a rule might prevent debtors from using divide and conquer tactics. The problem is that
even if these creditors have identical interests as a matter of formal law, their real
interests can be different. As we saw, an employee with a $100 claim might have an
interest in preserving the firm as a going concern, while a bondholder with a $100 claim
would not. To prevent divide and conquer tactics, the law would need first to transform
the employee’s non-monetized interest in the continuation of the employer into a
monetary claim (say, $10). Only then could the non-discrimination rule be applied in a
way that would prevent divide and conquer tactics. However, such intangible claims are
very difficult to quantify. Because the law does not quantify them, rigid adherence to the
nondiscrimination rule would require likes to be treated differently. This can prevent the
parties from agreeing to a plan that maximizes value. As we have seen, the law
compromises by giving the debtor the power to create classes of similar creditors, subject
to the bankruptcy judge’s supervision, while requiring that creditors in each class be
treated uniformly.
Bankruptcy law does not restrict divide-and-conquer behavior as much as labor
law does. Bankruptcy law has no analogy to the labor rules restricting communication
and governing elections. The reason is surely that the plan proposer does not have nearly
as much power over creditors as employers have over workers. There is no practical way
to disrupt communications between creditors, for example; by contrast, because the
workplace is the primary location for interaction among workers, and employers control
the workplace, the opportunities for divide-and-conquer tactics are more varied.
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C. Constitutional Design
In the design of constitutions, divide and conquer strategies play a dual role,
either as the problem that constitutional designers must solve or else as a solution that the
designers themselves use to cope with other problems. In the first case, the problem for
constitutional design is to prevent or inhibit the use of divide and conquer strategies by
the incumbent government, which may use those strategies to benefit itself while
reducing overall welfare. In the second case, constitutions themselves raise the costs of
cooperation to groups whose joint action would reduce overall welfare, such as a majority
faction seeking to exploit minorities. In any given constitution, however, there will be
tradeoffs between these two desiderata: the same structures that make it easier for groups
to coalesce to defeat a welfare-reducing sovereign can also make it easier for groups to
coalesce into an exploitative majority faction.
Divide-and-conquer as a problem. In one well-known model of constitutionalism
(Weingast 1997), the incumbent sovereign or government confronts two or more major
political entities: states or provinces in a federal system, political parties, socioeconomic
classes such as capitalists and workers, status groups such as nobles and commoners, or
ethnic groups such as Hutus and Tutsis. The incumbent requires the support of at least
one of the groups to remain in power, but if the two combine forces, the incumbent is
deposed. Given this, the incumbent must decide whether to transgress against one or
both groups by violating their rights. It is assumed that doing so will benefit the
incumbent, but reduce social welfare overall. The groups’ choice is whether to challenge
the incumbent’s transgression or instead to acquiesce.
In the simplest version of the problem, the incumbent is restricted to attempting a
transgression against both groups simultaneously or against neither. In this condition, the
two groups face a coordination problem, interpreted in Section II as a Stag Hunt game: it
is best for each group to challenge transgressions by the incumbent, conditional on the
other group also doing so, yet the worst outcome for each is to be the sole challenger,
which incurs the costs of challenging without blocking the incumbent’s transgression.
The game thus has two equilibria in pure strategies, one in which both acquiesce, and one
in which neither does so.
The incumbent’s position improves dramatically if it may adopt a divide and
conquer strategy, in which the incumbent can transgress against only one of the two
groups while offering the other a side payment from the spoils of transgression against
the first. In a single-shot interaction, the result is that the group who is offered the side
payment has a dominant strategy of acquiescence. Knowing this, the group whose rights
are violated will acquiesce as well, since challenging the incumbent is all cost and no
benefit. Here the incumbent’s bribe has in effect converted the Stag Hunt into a
Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which each group’s first choice is defection rather than
cooperation.
Faced with the threat of divide and conquer tactics, the groups may sustain
cooperation against the incumbent by either of two mechanisms. First, in an indefinitely
repeated interaction, the folk theorem applies and acquiescence to the incumbent
becomes just one possible equilibrium. If neither group discounts the future too heavily,
then cooperation may be sustained by a trigger strategy in which each group threatens to
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withdraw support from the other if the other does not support the first. Because a
withdrawal of support would expose the would-be defector to transgression in all future
periods, each group maximizes its payoff by cooperating in the present, conditional on
the other doing so, and cooperation to block the incumbent’s transgressions is an
equilibrium.
A second mechanism involves “altruistic punishment,” in which individuals are
willing to incur personal costs to punish violation of social norms. The threat of altruistic
punishment can enforce norms even without repeated play. In single-shot dictator games,
in which player A can allocate a fixed surplus between herself and player B, it has been
found that a third party C who has no stake in the allocation will incur a personal cost to
punish A-players who allocate more than half the surplus to themselves (Fehr &
Fischbacher 2004). If the A-player anticipates this response, she has an incentive for
self-restraint.
There are three major implications for constitutional design. First, the
incumbent’s ability to play divide and conquer can allow it to maintain power even if it
would be crushed by a united opposition. Indeed, as Section II discussed, all that is
necessary is the potential to divide and conquer (Acemoglu, Robinson & Verdier 2004).
In the example motivating this refinement, kleptocratic leaders who control and exploit
national resources manage to maintain power despite the fact that kleptocracy makes
everyone else worse off. The reason is that a challenge will succeed only if all political
groups join forces, but if a challenge occurs, the incumbent kleptocrat will offer a bribe to
one of the putative allies to buy off its opposition, and the other challenging groups will
be made worse off by their failed attempt. Anticipating this, the groups will not
challenge, and the kleptocrat remains in power without sharing national resources with
anyone. The actual use of divide and conquer strategies by the kleptocrat remains off the
equilibrium path, so observation of actual societies will tend to understate the importance
of divide and conquer as a political mechanism.
Second, written constitutions or clear constitutional norms can lower the costs of
coordination for groups who benefit by jointly opposing the incumbent’s transgressions.
Well-defined constitutional rules, whether written or unwritten, define what counts as a
transgression and thus ensure that the incumbent’s decision to transgress is common
knowledge – not only will it be known to all groups, but all groups will know that others
know of it, and so on. Where the groups have Stag Hunt preferences for conditional
cooperation, defining precisely what counts as a transgression thus provides a focal point
for coordinating resistance. Even where the groups have Prisoners’ Dilemma
preferences, and would thus benefit most of all from defecting while other cooperate,
they have an interest in coordinating so long as the game is indefinitely repeated and
neither group is too myopic or impatient. In such cases, defining precisely what counts
as a transgression allows each to implement its trigger strategy, threatening to punish the
other for failure to provide support, and thus sustains cooperation as an equilibrium.
Third, constitutional nondiscrimination rules can be justified (although not
necessarily explained) as mechanisms whose effect is to at least partly block the
incumbent’s best strategy of playing divide and conquer through discriminatory bribes.
Standard nondiscrimination rules include not only vague or ambiguous commitments to
“equal protection of the laws,” but also more pointed restrictions. In the United States,
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the federal constitution mandates that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States,”35 that rules of naturalization and laws on the subject of
bankruptcies must likewise be “uniform . . throughout the United States” and that “[n]o
Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one
State over those of another.” In the world of the late 18th century, these were
consequential restrictions whose effect (and, to some degree, purpose) was to prevent the
new federal government from playing divide and conquer strategies against the several
states.36 At the state level, constitutions frequently ban “special or local” legislation, as
opposed to general legislation; ban governmental “gifts, subsidies or grants to private
individuals” (Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett 2007, 358); and require laws, especially tax
laws, to be uniform across the state.
Divide and conquer as a solution. In another perspective, divide and conquer can
itself represent a solution to problems of constitutional design. For Madison, a basic
problem of constitutionalism was how to prevent the formation of the oppressive majority
factions that had plagued the democratic republics of the past.37 “Three motives only can
restrain in such cases” – prudence, reputation, and religion – but all were inadequate.
Prudence, or the majority’s enlightened self-interest, is shown by experience to have
“little effect on individuals, and perhaps still less on a collection of individuals, and least
of all on a majority with the public authority in their hands.” Concern for reputation
(what Madison called “character”) “loses its efficacy in proportion to the number which
is to divide the praise or the blame”; moreover, “as it [i.e., reputation] has reference to
public opinion, which is that of the majority, the Standard is fixed by those whose
conduct is to be measured by it.” Religion, likewise, fails because collective action
amplifies majoritarian passions. In “popular Assembl[ies] . . . individuals join without
remorse in acts against which their consciences would revolt, if proposed to them
separately in their closets.”
In all these cases, the putative checks on majoritarian oppression are undermined
by the collective nature of governmental decisionmaking. Madison’s idea was to turn the
problem on its head, exploiting problems of collective action to promote the public good.
One major strand in the solution was to increase the scale of the new republic, raising the
costs of organizing a majority faction:
[W]hat remedy can be found in a republican Government, where the majority
must ultimately decide, but that of giving such an extent to its sphere, that no
common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the whole number
in an unjust pursuit. In a large Society, the people are broken into so many
interests and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the
requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole. . . . If the
same sect form a majority and have the power, other sects will be sure to be
depressed. Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain
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qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just
principles.
Madison’s divide and conquer strategy for constitutional designers can be
interpreted in several different ways.. First is a coordination or Stag Hunt problem: the
large scale of the republic might simply make it difficult for different individuals or
subgroups to communicate, under the technological and economic conditions of the 18th
century, and thus to coordinate their plans for political action. A second interpretation
draws on the logic of collective action and is usually modeled according to the Prisoners’
Dilemma: latent majority factions will be less likely to organize as the scale of the
republic grows. Even if all members of the latent majority would prefer collective action
to no action, and thus share a common interest to that extent, each would prefer most of
all that others bear the cost of organization, and this effect increases as the number
required for collective action increases. Finally, and most centrally, Madison argues that
scale reduces the chance that a majority will hold the same preferences or experience the
same sentiments or passions in the first place. Irreducible disagreement about what sort
of collective action would be best (even if it could be achieved) divides the numerical
majority as effectively as would discriminatory offers. Whatever the precise mechanism,
Madison’s solution resembles the “combine and conquer” tactics used by union-busting
employers: lumping diverse groups into one large political entity – the extended republic
– makes cooperation more difficult to achieve. The only difference is that, on Madison’s
account, the precluded cooperation would be harmful, so the “combine and conquer”
tactic is used to achieve beneficial ends.
Tradeoffs. If divide and conquer is sometimes a welfare-enhancing means to
prevent latent majorities from organizing, and sometimes a welfare-reducing strategy of
the incumbent government that can only be overcome by the formation of a majority,
then the constitutional designer faces a tradeoff between the risk that majorities will form
when undesirable and the risk that they will not form when desirable. Because the same
institutional structures that reduce the former risk increase the latter, an optimization
problem arises. Madison recognized this point as well, noting that “[a]s in too small a
sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed [against] the weaker party; so
in too extensive a one, a defensive concert may be rendered too difficult against the
oppression of those entrusted with the administration” (Madison 1787). Divide and
conquer, in other words, could be extended too far; the scale of the new republic could
exceed the optimum as well as fall short of it. It is hard to say anything general about this
issue, but it underscores that divide and conquer is intrinsically neutral from the
standpoint of welfare; it can be put to good ends or bad ones.
D. Vote-Buying and the Separation of Powers
Whether under written or unwritten constitutions, a major arena for divide and
conquer tactics involves the relationship between a sole executive and a multimember
legislature. In this constellation, the executive occupies the same bargaining position as a
sole defendant faced by multiple plaintiffs or a sole incumbent seller faced with multiple
buyers, two structurally similar cases discussed in Section II. The executive can use
divide and conquer tactics to exploit problems of collective action among the legislators,
especially by using discriminatory offers. As in other settings, however, the mere
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anticipation of such offers by legislators can be enough to accomplish the executive’s
ends, in which case the offers will never have to be actually paid.
For concreteness, we will focus on David Hume’s account of the unwritten British
constitution of the 18th century;38 the basic ideas, however, generalize easily to relations
between the President and Congress in a separation of powers system. Hume explained
the “balance” of the British constitution as a byproduct of executive corruption, effected
through divide and conquer tactics. Although the power of Parliament had swelled
beyond all control after 1688, the Crown managed to maintain the balance by offering
government sinecures and other forms of in-kind bribery to induce a decisive bloc of
legislators to sell their votes on the cheap. “The interest of the body [i.e. the Commons]
is here restrained by that of the individuals . . . . [T]he house of commons stretches not
its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of
its members.”
Hume is vague on the details; two main interpretations are possible. In the first,39
the Crown offers a cheap bribe to each legislator for voting in its favor. Suppose there is
a private cost to each legislator of voting with the Crown when other legislators do not;
perhaps the legislator is then conspicuously exposed to the slings and arrows of critics,
whereas a mass vote in the Crown’s favor provides each legislator with political cover.
This is a Stag Hunt game, and two equilibria are possible in pure strategies: if legislators
expect that other legislators will vote with the Crown, then they will do so as well in
order to obtain the small bribe on offer, but they will not do so if they expect that other
legislators will vote against. The implication is that if legislators do vote with the Crown,
they will sell out for an aggregate bribe less than the total benefits to the Crown of the
enactment: “democratic legislators may refuse to sell a statute at all (a Nash equilibrium),
or they may sell it cheap (another Nash equilibrium), but they will not sell it dear.”
(Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1994, 313).
In this model, the same bribe is offered to each legislator. In a variant that allows
discriminatory offers, the Crown can exclude the unfavorable equilibrium of rejection by
all legislators by offering a bribe to only a decisive fraction of legislators, with the bribe
set just high enough to slightly overcompensate the legislators for the private cost of
voting with the Crown. Then voting with the Crown becomes a dominant strategy; each
legislator offered the bribe benefits from accepting it no matter what other legislators do.
The advantage to the Crown is that a larger bribe for a smaller number of legislators may
be cheaper than a small bribe for all legislators.
In a second, somewhat different interpretation,40 we drop the assumption that
there is a private cost to legislators of voting with the Crown when other legislators do
not, replacing it with the assumption that individual legislators dislike the Crown’s policy
and thus incur some private cost if the Crown’s policy is enacted. Here the Crown has a
neat trick, based on the mechanism of bribery through offers conditional on others’ votes.
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The Crown offers each voter a large sum41 for providing the pivotal vote in the Crown’s
favor, a token sum for a nonpivotal vote in the Crown’s favor, and nothing for a vote with
the opposition. Any given legislator then reasons that if a majority of other legislators
vote either for or against, he does best by voting with the Crown; the policy will be
enacted, or not, regardless of what he does, so taking the offered pittance is best in either
case. However, if other legislators split equally and the legislator knows he will be
pivotal, he still does best by voting with the Crown. The trick is that because all
legislators reason this way, all vote with the Crown, none provides the pivotal vote, and
the Crown obtains a decisive bloc of votes in its favor while paying each of its voters a
token amount. The paradox is that no legislator obtains the large payout for being
pivotal, although it seems that one of them must have been so.
In either model, the Crown exploits the logic of collective action for its own
advantage. Legislator-sellers could benefit if they could collude by committing to sell
their votes only as a group, in which case legislators could extract the full aggregate value
of their votes from the Crown. But the larger the number of legislators, the more costly
coordination becomes (Dal Bo 2007). Divide and conquer tactics that will not work on a
small committee of decisionmakers can work in a larger modern legislature or a mass
election. Moreover, vote-selling is corrupt behavior condemned by public norms, so the
mutual transparency needed for coordination among legislators is lacking; each legislator
sells his vote in the shadows and all legislators suffer by doing so. The overall result is
that, as Hume wrote in a related context, “much less property in a single hand [i.e. that of
the Crown] will be able to counterbalance a greater property in several; not only because
it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures; but
because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the same property,
when dispersed (Hume 1875, 122).”
Hume argued that, given the baseline of an all-powerful Parliament, these votebuying mechanisms maintained the balance of the British constitution and thus promoted
social welfare, but even if that argument was correct it merely represents a contingent
feature of Hume’s own time. Under different circumstances, the same divide and
conquer tactics might allow the executive to dominate the legislature and thereby upset
the balance in its own favor. If constitutional designers fear that executive vote-buying
will reduce social welfare, they may attempt to restrict the executive’s opportunity to do
so.
Depending upon the precise mechanism of vote-buying at issue, the solution we
have seen in several previous contexts -- a nondiscrimination rule -- may not work. In
the second interpretation discussed above, where bribes can be made conditional on
others’ votes, the Crown’s offer is in one sense discriminatory, because only the pivotal
voter is promised a large bribe, but in another sense it is not: the initial offer is made to
all legislators on equal terms, and in any event the large bribe is never paid.
Constitutional designers must therefore fall back upon other devices. Outright money
bribes are typically condemned by social norms and ordinary criminal law, so the Crown
in Hume’s time offered in-kind bribes in the form of official posts and sinecures. In the
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United States, however, such tactics are partly constrained by the Emoluments Clause
and the Incompatibility Clause. The latter bars legislators from simultaneous service in
the executive branch, while the former limits the President’s ability to appoint a legislator
to a newly-created executive post, or a post whose salary has been increased, during the
legislator’s elected term.42
Another mechanism is the secret ballot, which as we have seen blocks the offer of
a bribe conditional on casting the pivotal vote, by making performance unverifiable.
Parliament’s efforts to keep its proceedings secret, in the 17th and 18th centuries, may be
justified in this light. However, many constitutions require transparency for legislative
votes, in order to promote political accountability. In the United States, the Journal
Clause has this effect by establishing a public record of congressional proceedings and by
requiring a roll-call vote when demanded by only one-fifth of the legislators present.43
E. Imperialism, Colonialism, and Race Relations
As illustrated in Section I, the Roman empire is traditionally associated with a
policy of divide et impera, yet the expanding Republic routinely used similar tactics.
When Rome was conquering Italy in the 4th and early 3d centuries B.C.E., “[h]er enemies
rarely showed that harmony among themselves and that singleness of purpose which
characterized the Romans, and Rome did her best to develop the spirit of discord among
them by arraying community against community and the aristocracy against the
democracy” (Abbott 1901, 58). Rome refused to deal with its adversaries as a bloc, and
instead “made a separate treaty with each one of the Latin communities, with the express
purpose of preventing future confederations between them” (Abbott 1901, 57). In order
to destroy channels of communication and to forestall reciprocity between potential
cooperators, these treaties deprived the Latin communities not only of the right to trade
with one another, but also of the right to intermarry (Abbott 1901, 57).
Divide and conquer has been a time-honored strategy of many other imperial and
colonial powers as well.44 Such powers are typically overstretched and understaffed;
their problem is how to achieve maximum control with a minimum of resources and
force. Divide and conquer is an attractive solution in such environments, because it is
cheaper to set factions within the latent opposition to fighting among themselves, and if
necessary to defeat them piecemeal, than it is to defeat them as a unified enemy.
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In some cases, the imperial divide and conquer policy rested straightforwardly on
discriminatory offers to split the opposition. British policy in India was to create and
exploit divisions among the indigenous monarchies by means of explicit or implicit
subsidies to loyal allies, “who competed with each other for imperial favours” (Ashton
1982, 4). Although some of these subsidies were large, some merely involved honors
and titles (Copland 1982, 94), and in any form they were certainly cheaper than all-out
conflict against a unified opposition.
In other cases, imperialist divide and conquer tactics involved fomenting divisions
among subjugated groups by sowing mutual mistrust, rather than by selective bribery. In
the British colonies of the American southeast,
[i]n addition to keeping Indians and Negroes apart, Whites pitted the colored
groups against each other. In 1725, Richard Ludlam a South Carolina minister,
confessed that ‘we make use of a Wile for our [present] Security to make Indians
& Negro’s a cheque upon each other least by their Vastly Superior Numbers we
should be crushed by one or the other.’ . . . In 1758, James Glen, long governor
of South Carolina, explained . . . that ‘it has allways been the policy of this govert
to creat an aversion in them [Indians] to Negroes’ (Willis 1963, 165).
Of course, the two forms of divide and conquer tactics could be used in
combination. In 1777, the British Governor of St. Vincent wrote to his superiors that “by
dint of address, by properly working on their different passions, and by some treats [i.e.
presents], I have happily effected a breach of [a threatened] Alliance between the
runaway negroes and . . . the Charibs [an indigenous people].” (Fisher 1945, 437). By
warning the Charibs that the “runaway negroes,” who seem to have been a band of
escaped slaves, would plunder their settlements, the Governor “laid the grounds of that
Jealousie, and distrust, which I wanted to avail myself of.” (Fisher 1945, 437). The
Governor’s strategy, that is, had two prongs: bribery of the Charib chiefs, and inducing
distrust between the two groups.
In cases of this sort, the relationship between the subjugated groups may be
interpreted in three ways. In the simplest version, the groups had Prisoners’ Dilemma
preferences; the first choice of each was to gain the benefits of the other’s resistance to
the British while refusing itself to contribute to the joint cause. As indicated in Section
II, even where such games are repeated, a unitary actor who can affect payoffs – here the
Governor – may be able to block cooperation by means of discriminatory offers, making
defection a dominant strategy for both groups.
In a second version, it was a Stag Hunt Game under complete information, in
which it was common knowledge among both groups that the other’s first choice was to
cooperate against the British. However, lack of cooperation is also an equilibrium in
such games; the Governor’s discriminatory bribes to the Charibs, the apparent inability of
the Charibs to communicate with the runaways, and the focal-point effect of the
Governor’s announcement to the Charibs that the runaways would not cooperate, all
conduced to selecting the equilibrium of noncooperation. After the Governor bribed the
Charib chiefs, the “negroes” attempted “acts of violence . . . against the women of the
nearest Charib settlement, and [attempted] to cut off the Chief of the same for having
been with me and received presents as they said.” (Fisher 1945, 438). The implication is
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that the “negroes” viewed the Chief’s receipt of presents as a defecting rather than
cooperative move.
In yet a third interpretation, it was a Stag Hunt Game under incomplete
information, in which each group’s true preference would be to cooperate with the other,
but in which each group is uncertain of the others’ preferences. In such cases,
cooperation can be forestalled by the Governor’s strategy of sowing “Jealousie, and
distrust” -- inducing one or both players to believe that the other player has Prisoners’
Dilemma preferences instead of Stag Hunt preferences for conditional cooperation, or a
disposition to exploit rather than to reciprocate.45 This version of the Stag Hunt game,
however, requires that the third party’s statements be credible. Here the evidence does
not explain why, exactly, the Charibs would take the Governor’s warnings seriously.
While the divide and conquer strategies pursued by imperial and colonial powers
are often successful in the short run, they can be self-defeating in the long run. The
presence of the dominant power, and the very fact that it is known to use divide and
conquer tactics, both tend to create emotions of solidarity among indigenous groups,
unifying the opposition. In eighteenth century India, “there was no political discourse . . .
to construe resistance to the foreigners as a national war for the defence of the country.”
However, the British use of divide and conquer tactics themselves provoked the first
stirrings of Indian unity. In 1780, “the Poona minister Nana Fadnis … wrote to his old
antagonist Haidar Ali of Mysore [in the following terms]:
Divide and grab is their [i.e. the British] main principle . . . They are bent upon
subjugating the States of Poona, Nagpur, Mysore and Haidarabad one by one,
enlisting the sympathy of one to put down the other. They know best how to
destroy Indian cohesion (Louis et al. 1998, 519).
The result was a joint plan “for the expulsion of the English nation from India” (Louis et
al 1998, 519). Although the plan did not ultimately succeed, such efforts laid the
groundwork for Indian nationalism.
F. International Law
Political scientists writing about international relations frequently describe divideand-conquer behavior among states. The classic balance of power scenario involves a
small number of Great Powers that are in a security competition—each state seeks to
maximize its power at the expense of other states. Initially, there may be an equilibrium
in which the states are at peace because neither state is powerful enough to defeat any
other state. Then a shock occurs—one state, a “rising power,” like Germany at the end of
the nineteenth century, poses a threat to one or more of its neighbors. Other states
“balance” the rising power by forging alliances with the state or states being threatened.
The balancers in this way attempt to anticipate and foreclose a divide-and-conquer
strategy by the rising power, which, after conquering the first state and eliminating it as a
threat, might turn its attention to one of the remaining states.46
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Examples are numerous. “Walter Lippman and George Kennan defined the aim
of American grand strategy [during the cold war] to be preventing any single state from
controlling the combined resources of industrial Eurasia, and they advocated U.S.
intervention on which side was weaker when this prospect emerged (Walt 1985, 9).”47 In
both World War I and II, Germany’s strategy was first to conquer France and then
Russia. Britain countered by forming early alliances with France and Russia; the United
States would follow this strategy as well. In World War I, France and Russia formed an
alliance to counter Germany’s divide and conquer strategy; in World War II, Germany
anticipated this move by entering a secret alliance with Russia, which it broke after
conquering France. In the nineteenth century, Britain served as an “offshore balancer,”
offering to come to the aid of weak states on the continent that were threatened by
powerful states like Germany and France. Then as France declined, Britain joined France
to counter Russia (Liska 1957, 37–39).
The classic balance of power cases involved a more anarchical international
environment than that which exists today, but divide-and-conquer tactics and balancing
counter-tactics remain alive and well. For example, in 2003 Donald Rumsfeld famously
divided the European Union into “Old Europe” (consisting of France and Germany) and
“New Europe” (consisting of Poland, Spain, Italy, and the UK). The division did not
reflect the age of the countries in question but their orientation toward the United States.
Rumsfeld hoped to forestall a united front against the American-led invasion of Iraq by
implicitly offering American favor to states that supported the invasion. These states
resented Franco-German leadership of the EU or had other reasons for strengthening ties
with the United States, and thus could be more easily extracted from a European coalition
against the invasion.
Even within the European Union, divide and conquer tactics can be observed.
The European Commission has advanced integration by (ironically) using divide and
conquer tactics against states that resist integration (Schmidt 2000). In the 1990s, the
Commission sought to break monopolies on airport ground-handling services in several
states. It could not initially pass legislation that would have outlawed these monopolies
because seven states in which the monopolies prevailed prevented a qualified majority
from being formed in the Council. Instead, the Commission launched investigations of
the monopolies on the basis of existing European law, in three of the states, and informed
a fourth state that aid for its national airline would be withdrawn unless it agreed to the
new legislation. The first three states ended their monopolies by changing domestic law,
and the fourth changed its position on the Commission’s proposed law. With four of the
seven opponents to new legislation now on its side, the Commission was able to obtain
approval for a new law in the Council (Schmidt 2000, 46–48).48 The new law swept in
the three holdouts.
Divide and conquer tactics also play an important role in the modern international
trading system. As part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which was
launched in 1986, the United States sought the elimination of agricultural subsidies and
other agriculture-related trade barriers. Because the EC operated by unanimity and, its
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most protectionist country, France, opposed concessions, the EC rejected the American
position. The United States responded by threatening to slap punitive tariffs on French,
German, and Italian targets but not on industries in other countries. It hoped to pressure
France directly, and encourage Germany and Italy to pressure France, without incurring
the costs of a trade war with other European countries. The divide-and-conquer strategy
met with limited success, however. In the end, the United States obtained only modest
concessions (Meunier 2000, 122–26).
The United States tried divide and conquer in negotiations over public
procurement liberalization in the same trade round. This time the EC sought
liberalization and the United States resisted. After liberalizing public procurement within
the common market, the EC threatened to impose discriminatory barriers against the
United States unless the United States repealed “Buy American” legislation that required
the U.S. government to favor American producers. After further negotiations and
agreements, the United States sought to undermine European unity by concluding a
bilateral telecommunications agreement with Germany, which eliminated barriers for
American and German procurement of telecommunications products and services from
those two countries. The United States publicly announced the agreement, even though
the Germans apparently hoped that it would be kept secret (Meunier 2000, 126–29).
Although a commentator at the time wrote that “if the Americans’ plan was to try to
erode Europe’s admirable yet shaky unified stance on trade policy, they succeeded”
(Meunier 2000, 126–29), in fact the European institutions deemed the U.S.-German deal
void and the European countries managed to close ranks.
But later the United States had more success with divide-and-conquer tactics. In
the 1990s the United States sought to liberalize international aviation. France, Germany,
and Britain had long resisted these efforts, fearing that their national airlines would not
survive open competition. In this case, European law did not give the EC the power to
negotiate on behalf of all the member states, and the divide-and-conquer strategy proved
effective. The United States sought to enter bilateral open skies agreements with smaller
European states, and succeeded in concluding a deal with the Netherlands, among others.
This threatened to divert air traffic from other European states, and in response European
institutions were given some authority to negotiate a deal with the United States on behalf
of the EC. Here, partly because of the weaker institutional legal structure in the EC for
addressing international aviation, the divide-and-conquer strategy helped ensure a
favorable outcome for the United States (Meunier 2000, 129–31; See also Grant 2002).
Examples can be multiplied. The United States has pursued a divide-and-conquer
strategy in TRIPs-related negotiations with developing countries, trying to use bilateral
trade agreements to peel off poor countries from the G-20 coalition led by Brazil and
India (Yu 2005, n 152 – 53). The EC has pursued a divide-and-conquer strategy against
developing countries that oppose its agricultural policies by offering preferential trade
agreements to Mercosur countries in Latin America (Drezner 2004). The United States
has also tried to split Latin American countries in a range of environmental and trade
negotiations—for example, in one instance entering an environmental agreement with
Chile in order to isolate Brazil and Argentina (Block 2003).
All of our examples can be analyzed using our Stag Hunt and Prisoners’ Dilemma
models, depending on the assumptions one makes about payoffs. In the balance of power
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scenario, the Stag Hunt seems to be the right model. Each of the weaker states faces a
choice between resisting the powerful state and appeasing it. If both states resist the
more powerful state, then they obtain the highest payoff (10). If a state appeases, it
receives the middle payoff (6). If a state resists while the other state appeases, it receives
the lowest payoff (0). The trade scenarios are similar but in some instances they might be
better modeled as a Prisoners’ Dilemma because (as in the open skies example) one state
can do better by defecting when others cooperate since it may be able to divert trade from
its partners.
We frequently observe the use of bribes and threats to divide and conquer. A
powerful nation offers aid and other benefits to countries that take its side; it threatens
those that do not. The target states try to cooperate but may have trouble doing so. The
European case is particularly interesting because the divide-and-conquer conflict takes
place at an institutional level. European countries try to forestall American divide-andconquer tactics by creating institutions that routinize interactions between European
countries. The institutions increase the benefits of cooperation by facilitating issue
linkages, and reduce the costs of cooperation by enhancing information about the moves
of each player (through independent courts and commissions). They also set up
mechanisms for resisting divide and conquer tactics by other countries. The unanimity
rule that prevails for some types of EC action prevents any member state from cutting a
deal outside the group. However, the unanimity rule has proven too cumbersome in
many settings; weaker voting rules are used but they also create vulnerabilities, as we
have seen.
The United States responds by trying to provoke member states to violate their
obligations under European law. The American response takes place at an institutional
level: the goal is not only to achieve agreement in certain issue areas, but also to sow
distrust among member states. As we saw in the procurement case, the U.S. strategy of
making a side agreement with Germany and then publicizing it was evidently intended to
embarrass Germany and cause other member states to doubt the robustness of EC
institutions.
At the international (as opposed to European) level, institutions are much weaker.
States outside Europe have not been as effective as the European states at establishing
institutions that forestall divide-and-conquer tactics, even though such institutions would
be in the interest of all. In the place of formal legal institutions, however, we do observe
the gradual emergence of a nondiscrimination norm. One such norm is that all countries
should join multilateral treaties that place identical obligations on all parties and that
bilateral treaties are frowned upon, except in narrow circumstances (Blum 2006). States
that violate this norm are frequently criticized. For example, the United States has been
criticized for failing to join a number of multilateral treaties—including the Law of the
Sea convention, the Kyoto Accord, the Landmines Convention, the Rights of the Child
Convention, and many others—on the grounds that most other states have joined these
treaties and thus the United States blocks the emergence of uniform international rules of
behavior See, e.g. Harold Koh (2003). The concern is not just that the United States fails
to contribute to the creation of some global public good. It is that the United States will
not be subject to institutions set up to foreclose divide-and-conquer tactics in particular

34

issue areas—for example, in the distribution of sea resources under the Law of the Sea
treaty.
This problem is particularly acute in the area of trade. The GATT/WTO system
has a strong nondiscrimination norm. The most-favored nation rule requires that all
tariff reductions be applied to all member states. This rule prevents states from offering
trade benefits as bribes when they use divide-and-conquer tactics against other states.
Unfortunately, GATT rules create a loophole for preferential trade areas—treaties that
reduce trade barriers for a subset of WTO members. States have exploited this loophole,
and so now it is routine for the United States, for example, to reward allies by offering
them bilateral trade pacts (Bhagwati 2002).
We see the same phenomenon at the level of general international law. The
nondiscrimination norm has provoked a counter-norm—the norm of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” in environmental treaties and its twin, “special and
differential treatment” for trade treaties (Stone 2004). Both norms have been asserted by
developing nations that argue that multilateral treaties should impose weaker obligations
on developing countries than on rich countries. The Kyoto Protocol, for example,
imposes greenhouse gas limits only on developed countries and not on developing
countries. Similar norms of differential treatment can be found in the Law of the Sea
convention and a treaty that limits emissions of ozone (Safrin 2008; Christopher Stone
(2004).49
The problem with the nondiscrimination norm is that, while it may prevent some
divide and conquer tactics, it sweeps too broadly, as it implies that differential treatment
cannot be justified on the basis of the capacities of states. The counter-norm tries to hive
off a class of poor states that can be treated differently, but only if they are treated better,
and presumably uniformly so. This pattern resembles the effort in labor law to prevent
discrimination within classes but not between classes; here, the idea is that there are two
classes of states—rich and poor—with nondiscrimination required within each class, and
discrimination between classes permissible as long as it favors the poor class.
Unfortunately, this classification is far too crude. All states are different, giving rise both
to legitimate discrimination among states (on the basis of capacity, for example) and
division and conquest that exploits differences in order to undermine cooperation.
G. Litigation, Settlement, and Plea Bargaining
Divide and conquer strategies also appear in a variety of settings where a unitary
litigant faces a group of opponents. These include tort settings, for example, where a
defendant is being sued by a group of separate plaintiffs who will enjoy economies of
scale in litigation. They also can arise in criminal settings when a resource-constrained
prosecutor is negotiating plea bargains with a group of defendants who have allegedly
committed unrelated crimes. They can arise in civil settings where a group of defendants
are being held jointly liable for the injuries sustained by a unitary plaintiff.
Suppose that there are two plaintiffs who are suing a single defendant. If a
plaintiff goes to trial, either individually or jointly with the other plaintiff, the court will
award damages of $100 to that plaintiff. Trials are expensive, however – let’s assume
49
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that the cost of a trial is $150. If the plaintiffs both pursue the defendant, they will enjoy
economies of scale in litigation, each bearing costs of $75. Litigating jointly therefore
gives each plaintiff a payoff of $100 – $75 = $25. If a plaintiff goes to trial alone,
however, he will have to bear the $150 entire cost giving a net payoff of $100 –$150 = –
$50. The decision to litigate corresponds to the Stag Hunt Game: a plaintiff will only
find it in his or her interest to pursue the defendant if the other plaintiff pursues the
defendant as well. The defendant can take advantage of the plaintiffs through a divide
and conquer strategy. By offering to settle with one plaintiff for $26, say, and offering
the other plaintiff nothing, he can settle the claims for $26 in total. The first plaintiff has a
dominant strategy to accept the $26, and the second plaintiff drops his or her claim (Che
& Spier 2008). In this way, the plaintiffs are coerced into settling for less than their
claims are jointly worth.50
Note that the plaintiffs in this example would be jointly better off if they could
coordinate their actions. It is in their mutual interest to reject the divide and conquer
offers, since going to trial will give them a net payoff of $25 + $25 = $50, while
accepting the offers yields $26 + $0 = $26. Coordination might be achieved in a variety
of ways. Suppose that the plaintiffs can get together before in advance, before they know
who the “favored” plaintiff will be. In this case, they might agree to join their claims and
make a single acceptance decision. By doing so, the plaintiffs can commit themselves
not to accept offers that add up to less than $50 in total. Note that such arrangements
would be facilitated if the plaintiffs retained the same legal counsel, or if the plaintiffs
can write binding contracts with one another. In addition to helping the victims of torts
receive higher compensation for their injuries, these arrangements also enhance the
incentives of defendants to take precautions to avoid accidents in the first place.51
Divide and conquer strategies may also be adopted by a prosecutor (the unitary
actor) when negotiating with multiple criminal defendants. Suppose that a district
attorney is dealing with a heavy case load; resources are limited and it simply isn’t
possible to take all of the defendants to trial. The prosecutor might be tempted to offer
reduced sentences to the defendants, since he lacks a credible threat to devote the
required litigation efforts to all of them. But by sequencing the defendants in a
predetermined order and targeting particular defendants for harsher treatment, the
prosecutor can coerce the defendants to agree to heavier sentences than they would
otherwise accept (Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar 2007). As in our previous examples of stag
hunt games, the defendants would receive jointly higher payoffs if they refused to accept
the prosecutor’s offers. Indeed, their ability to accept plea bargains can make them
collectively worse off.
Divide and conquer mechanisms may also be adopted in civil litigation settings by
unitary plaintiffs who have been harmed by the joint actions of several injurers. Under
joint and several liability, a single losing defendant can be held responsible for the entire
level of the plaintiff's damages. Cases along these lines are common in toxic torts, where
50

The ongoing work of Lavie (2008) explores the ex ante and ex post mechanisms that defendants may
adopt to facilitate these and related divide-and-conquer tactics.
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The social desirability of enhanced incentives hinges on whether the incentives were too high or too low
to begin with (Shavell 1997). The use of these strategies can also increase the settlement rate (Che & Spier
2008).
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multiple defendants contributed to polluting a waste site. The rules of joint and several
liability have interesting implications for the settlement behavior of the litigants. It has
been shown that the likelihood of settlement and the magnitude of the settlement offers
hinge on a variety of factors including the treatment of prior settlements when
determining the liability of a non-settling defendant and the degree of correlation between
the defendant's cases (Kornhauser & Revesz 1994a, 1994b). Chang & Sigman (2000)
find support for Kornhauser and Revesz’s model using data on disputes between the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Superfund defendants. Under a pro tanto
setoff rule, the liability of a non-settling defendant is reduced, dollar for dollar, by the
value of the previous settlements. When the defendant’s cases are sufficiently correlated,
the plaintiff can coerce the defendants into settling their claims for significantly more
than the value of the damages that they caused.
To see why this is true, suppose that there are two identical defendants who would
either lose together or win together should they go to trial. In other words, the
defendants’ cases are perfectly correlated. The plaintiff’s total damages are $80 and the
probability that the plaintiff will win at trial is 50%. If both defendants go to trial, then
the expected payment of each defendant is $20; they are held liable half the time and split
the $80 between them. Suppose the plaintiff presents each defendant with an offer to
settle for S = $20. If the first defendant accepts the offer then the second defendant's
liability has changed: under the pro tanto setoff rule, the second defendant's liability is
capped at $80 − $20 = $60, which now implies an expected judgment of $30. The
plaintiff can take advantage of this by offering to settle with the second defendant for
$30. Through this divide and conquer strategy, the plaintiff can coerce the defendants to
settle for $20 + $30 = $50, more than the $40 they would pay if they both went to trial.52
H. Antitrust Law
Divide and conquer strategies may also be used by competitors in markets to
enhance their market power. One well-known line of economics-based research, often
referred to as the “Naked Exclusion” literature, argues that exclusive dealing contracts
can be used by incumbents to profitably exclude more efficient entrants when there are
economies of scale in production. 53 Intuitively, entry becomes unprofitable for the
entrant when sufficiently many buyers have agreed to exclusive deals, since the entrant
cannot achieve minimum efficient scale. In this setting, the decision by a single buyer to
sign an exclusive contract with the incumbent firm imposes a negative externality on the
other buyers and increases their incentive to sign exclusive deals as well. As in the Stag
Hunt game, the buyers are lured by the safety of exclusivity with the incumbent
monopolist and shy away from social cooperation with the other buyers. Through divide-
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and-conquer strategies, the incumbent can effectively exploit the negative externalities
among the buyers and foreclose the market.54
These types of strategies have been observed in practice. Anheuser-Busch, the
largest beer company in the United States, adopted so-called “100% share of mind”
contracts with its distributors in the 1990s, preventing them from carrying competitors’
brands. These tactics were viewed by analysts as contributing to the slowing of the
growth of microbreweries during that decade, but were not strongly pursued by the
antitrust authorities (Wilke & Ortega 1998).55 Similarly, Microsoft’s adoption of perprocessor licenses in the 1990’s allegedly prevented the manufacturers of personal
computers from distributing operating systems that competed with Microsoft’s DOS and
Windows, hastening the exit of competitor Novell. Under the terms of their settlement
agreement, this practice was discontinued.
While there is anecdotal evidence demonstrating the use of the strategic use of
exclusive dealing contracts in market settings, there have been very few empirical tests of
the exclusive dealing literature. This is due, no doubt, to the scarcity of data since, in
practice, negotiations are private affairs and the contracts are not generally observed by
researchers.56 Recent work by Landeo and Spier (2008) presents experimental evidence,
showing that the ability to make discriminatory offers raises the likelihood of exclusion
and that communication between the buyers lowers it.

Conclusion
Our analysis has both explanatory and normative implications. At the level of
explanation, we have seen that divide and conquer is a basic tool for understanding the
dynamics of group interaction, and also that divide and conquer is invoked too casually in
legal theory, history, and politics. These two points are entirely consistent; when divide
and conquer is invoked, the analyst should explain what, precisely, the idea means in the
given case, or should at least explain why the evidence is too thin to arbitrate between the
alternative models we identify. Thus one of our central aims has been to offer a
taxonomy of divide-and-conquer mechanisms, with illustrations in diverse settings, in
order to encourage a more nuanced deployment of the idea in the future.
Divide and conquer tactics can be found in a range of settings that we have not
discussed, and that should be the subject of future research. In some cases, the state itself
uses divide and conquer tactics to counter antisocial group behavior. Examples are
conspiracy laws, which increase the cost of group membership by making members
responsible for the acts of other members, and whistleblower laws, which drive a wedge
between the interests of employer and worker. In other cases, the state restricts divide
and conquer strategies employed by private agents: for example, protections for minority
shareholders when corporate raiders obtain control of a firm through freeze-outs. In yet
another interesting setting, courts prevent governments from using eminent domain
54
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power to divide and conquer. Suppose, for example, the government announces a plan to
build a landfill in an area. It condemns one portion of the area, pays the fair market price,
and then waits for property values in adjoining areas to plummet before condemning
them as well. Under the “scope of the project” rule, the government must pay the preproject value of those lands rather than the market price at the time of condemnation
(United States v. Land 2000).
Normatively, divide and conquer is both a problem for law, when used as a tactic
by actors who produce net social harms, and also a solution that law can sometimes use
to control harmful collective action, as when the prosecutor exploits the Prisoners’
Dilemma to prevent collusion. Where divide and conquer is a problem, law can
sometimes increase social welfare by using a nondiscrimination rule, although we have
seen that the benefits of such rules trade off against the costs of treating unlike cases
alike; the inherent lumpiness of rules is a cost that may, depending on the circumstances,
exceed the gains from preventing divide and conquer tactics. Other mechanisms that can
block some divide and conquer tactics, such as the secret ballot, work only under special
conditions and have collateral costs. Where divide-and-conquer is a solution, law can
itself use divisive tactics to maximize social welfare, in order to prevent organized action
by groups with harmful purposes, or even to prevent their very formation. Normatively,
then, nothing general can be said in favor of or against the repertoire of divide and
conquer tactics and the repertoire of legal mechanisms for blocking such tactics; both the
tactics and the counter-tactics are powerful tools that can be put to good or bad uses,
depending upon context. The same is true of “combine and conquer,” which can be
suppressed, where it is desirable to do so, by rules requiring that groups be disaggregated
rather than consolidated.
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